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ABSTRACT 
 
 Insider threat problems are widespread in industry today. They have resulted in huge 
losses to organizations. The security reports by leading organizations point out the fact that there 
have been many more insider attacks in recent years than any other form of attack. Detection of 
these insider threats is a top priority. One problem facing the detection mechanisms is that the 
real data for modeling is not easily available. This thesis describes a simulator which can 
simulate the insiders and generate access information in the form of logs.  
Currently there are many methods which use data mining algorithms to detect insider 
attacks. Role based detection is a well known mechanism to accurately distinguish insider 
behavior from the normal behavior. The thesis focuses on the advantages of using role based 
mechanisms for insider threat detection. Five algorithms have been chosen and performance 
analysis of these under various scenarios is carried out.   The thesis discusses these results in 
detail.  
The simulator is built on the Scalable Simulation Framework (SSF). It is an extension of 
the Boeing simulator, JANUS. The simulator uses behavior files to model an insider/normal user 
and generates the access information using Markov chains.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Insider Threat Problem  
Security plays a very important role in the intelligence community. One of the main goals 
for the security field to bloom is confidentiality of information. A security breach can create 
immense problems. Information (data) is one of the main assets of an organization today. This 
information is very valuable to the competitors and criminals alike. Intellectual property leakage 
is rampant today and it is threatening the privacy of individuals and organizations. Information 
leakage in most scenarios is mainly intentional (attacks) rather than unintentional. Two of the 
well known attack methods are outsider attacks and insider attacks. Outsider threats used to be 
prevalent and organizations took great care in having security mechanisms to thwart them. But of 
late, insider attacks have become the primary threat to the computer systems. In the 2007 CSI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey [1], 59% of respondents reported that they had 
experienced insider abuse of network resources; 26% reported that over 40% of their total 
financial losses from cyber attacks were due to insiders [1, 2]. A recent FBI survey reported that 
the average cost of a successful attack by a malicious insider is nearly 50 times greater than the 
cost of an external attack [3]. 
An ‘outsider’ is one who gains illegal access to the company network/information and 
misuses it. ‘Misuse’ here can be defined as stealing information, selling it to others or destroying 
it. The act of carrying out such attacks by an outsider is known as an outsider attacks. He/She 
usually will not be a legitimate user of that information. A lot of research has been carried out in 
this field to prevent the outsiders from illegal access. One of the straightforward methods is 
access control. The ability of a user to use a resource is known as access. The means by which 
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this ability is restricted (denied) or granted is known as access control. Access controls decide on 
who will or will not have access to a resource. An outsider has to break the barriers set to gain 
access because he/she is not a legitimate user of that data. This gives the company ample 
opportunity to detect the outsiders. For example, a network security admin has to look out for 
hacks in the network or illegal attempts to access the databases etc. to detect an intrusion. Such 
accesses can also be caught and prevented before any harm/loss happens to the organization.  
   Insider attacks are different from outsider attacks in the sense that the attackers 
already have legal access to whatever information is to be protected. Tuglular and Spafford [4] 
state that “Inside attackers are those who are able to use a given computer system with a level of 
authority granted to them and who in so doing violate their organization’s security policy.” An 
insider is one who has legitimate access to the information and deliberately misuses the privilege 
[5] by either selling it or leaking it to competitors, thus causing loss to the organization. This 
kind of attack is known as insider attack. Insider attacks are found to be very difficult to catch. 
The insiders can no longer be referred to as perpetrators because they are technically ‘not 
perpetrating’. They are well within their access limit but use it with malicious intent. In contrast 
to outsider intrusion, insider attacks are very difficult to detect when they are being carried out.  
Insiders can be classified into 3 main groups [6] – masqueraders, legitimate users and 
clandestine users. Masqueraders obtain legitimate users’ identification and use it to access 
sensitive data. Legitimate users are those who have legal access to the data but may have 
malicious intent. Clandestine users bypass the system security to get access to unauthorized 
information. This thesis concentrates on detecting the second kind of insider and a few scenarios 
of the first kind.  
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 In outsider intrusion attacks, there is a breach in the rules one way or the other. But such 
rules do not apply to insider attacks. The attacks cannot be avoided on the fly as compared to 
outsider attacks where the damage can be minimized if the attack is detected soon enough. 
Usually insider attacks come to light only after the incident has taken place and there is no way 
to mitigate the loss. This is because the resources which are available for detection are very 
vague and there are many ways in which an abnormal user can avoid detection from monitoring 
devices.  
Much of the computer security budget in organizations goes to preventing outsider 
attacks. But the industry has seen a lot of insider abuse in recent times. An organization suffers a 
lot financially and technologically when subjected to insider attacks. Recent insider incidents at 
Ferrari, Intel, Boeing etc. give an indication of the huge effects on organizations. The 
intelligence agencies take extra caution in this regard because the assets to be protected from 
insider attacks are sensitive and can compromise national security. A leak or two from their 
organization can impact the whole country in a bad way. The loss associated with such incidents 
is huge and impact is great. Insider attack incidents at the intelligence agencies, such as the 
Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames cases, have caused a lot of concern to the intelligence 
community [2]. These attackers misused the access given to them, and went undetected for years. 
They were caught only after intelligence operations were started against them.  
The ease with which a malicious user can leak any confidential information is making it 
more difficult for these organizations to track and prevent them. Early detection of insider 
attacks on sensitive and valuable data has become very critical in mitigating the negative impacts 
on organizations. There has to be a balance between implementing the security measures to 
avoid insider attacks and ease of access and privacy of users in an organization. In this thesis, we 
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discuss the type of insider attacks involved with the resource access behavior of the users in an 
organization. Efforts have been made to recognize the various detection algorithms and analyze 
their performance with role based mechanisms to solve this insider threat problem.  
1.2 Existing Insider Threat Detection Systems 
A number of methods have been put forward to solve the insider threat problem [1, 3, 7-
13]. The use cases differ in each of the methods. Some of the well known insider detection 
methods are to track the employees’ accesses, monitor the mails, enforce strict security policies 
in an organization [14], install closed-circuit cameras, monitor users’ behavior etc. A lot of 
research has taken place to model the insider attacks and come up with algorithms to detect 
anomalous behavior.  
Signature based detection mechanisms are one of the ways to detect intrusion but they 
can detect only known types of attacks. Another mechanism, data mining based detection 
techniques (for intrusion detection), consists of two types: misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. Misuse detection also suffers from the inability to detect attacks whose instances are 
not known. This is because they try to detect anomalous behavior by pattern matching the user 
behavior with known and available malicious patterns and signatures. Anomaly detection is 
another type of intrusion detection where changes in normal behavior suggest the presence of 
intentional or unintentional attacks [15]. This mechanism is used to detect a lot of insider attack 
scenarios. We will discuss this mechanism in detail later.  
A stricter version of ensuring safety from insiders is to enforce the security policies. 
Access is allowed based on the principles of "least privilege and minimum requirements" [16]. 
These policies have been applied to the scenario of document access. The information flow 
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surrounding document access requests is used to identify abnormal insiders [16]. This is not an 
efficient method because, in an effort to thwart insider attacks, the accesses should not be 
restricted to all the users.  
Studies of algorithms which use outlier detection mechanism, nearest neighbor approach, 
and density based local outliers (LOF) [17] have been carried out extensively. Other algorithms 
being used for insider detection are supervised and unsupervised learning, naïve Bayes classifier, 
supervised and unsupervised support vector machines (SVMs), clustering etc. Detection systems 
based on statistical models are very effective too. Confidence intervals, multivariate models, 
operational models, Markov process models and time series models are a few of the statistical 
models currently being used to model insider detection systems. Another interesting mechanism 
is to classify and detect insider threats by considering the computing infrastructure level. This 
method monitors at the network level, the system level and even at the application level [18].   
IBM Identity Risk and Investigative Solution (IRIS) [6] is a behavior anomaly based 
system by IBM. IRIS uses peer group profiling, composite feature modeling and real time 
statistical data mining [6]. Logs generated in various components of the network are put together 
and analyzed by extracting the features and detecting the pattern in the behavior. Roles are 
formed based on the results and used in classifying the real time users as malicious or normal.  
There are no set rules to model and detect an insider. Choosing the right features is very 
critical for the detection mechanism to work efficiently. The features should be chosen so as to 
clearly distinguishes the normal users from the abnormal ones. It then becomes easy for the 
detection algorithms to flag such deviant behavior as malicious or subject it to further scrutiny.  
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1.3 Role Based Detection Mechanism  
Role based access control was formalized in 1992 by David Ferraiolo and Rick Kuhn 
[19]. This is a method which restricts system access to authorized users. It is also known by the 
term role based security. The concept of roles was first introduced by Kuhn and the model was 
named RBAC92. RBAC96 [20] added the concept of user to the roles.  
There are many access control mechanisms in use today.  
• BLP Model (Bell-La Padula): Bell-La Padula is a model which enforces access by using 
state machines. BLP can provide controlled access to information. This model applies 
security labels on objects and clearances for subjects. Security labels differ in their 
sensitivity levels (most sensitive to least sensitive). In this mechanism, the resources are 
divided into subjects and objects. Subjects are the ones who use the objects. BLP 
provides data confidentiality.  
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC): It is similar to any other access control but with the 
added advantage that the subject can pass on the permissions to any other subject. It gives 
the subject the ability to make policy decisions.  
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC): In this mechanism, the operating system constrains 
the ability of a subject to perform any action on the object. The subject cannot override 
the MAC mechanism. This mechanism is used to implement organization-wide security 
policies.   
 
RBAC is a flexible access control mechanism which is newer than DAC and MAC and 
has the capability to simulate both mechanisms. Examples of roles in an organization are 
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engineering roles, management roles, finance roles etc. Each role represents a different set of 
users. The main goal of classification of users into roles is to distinguish them from each other. A 
user can be a member of many roles too. Every user in a system belongs to a role. This is based 
on the user’s responsibilities in an organization. These roles are associated with 
permissions/access rights. The access rights differ between roles. The advantage of this kind of 
an access control is that the roles can be updated without modifying the permissions of the user. 
The user, when accessing any resource, has to go through the access control framework which 
checks if the user has access to the resource he/she is accessing. In a few organizations, the 
minimum set of privileges necessary for a job are recognized and applied. This concept of least 
privilege is also prevalent today. Role based controls can be imposed on any resource, be it 
document systems, database systems [21], computer resources, physical access etc. For example, 
engineering documents can be accessed by users in an engineering role only. Finance role 
members cannot access engineering documents. There can be another set of documents, sales 
documents, for example, which can be accessible by both the roles. A user can be a member of 
multiple roles too. If user A belongs to engineering and finance roles, he can access resources 
available to both roles. This security mechanism is an effective way to enforce organization-
oriented security policies. This ensures that users in one role do not snoop on other roles’ 
documents. The organization also has the framework to remove the access rights or grant new 
rights to the roles. They also can add/remove users from the roles. Association of role with a user 
can be established and deleted dynamically as the organization changes. For example, if an 
employee leaves the organization, his/her access rights will be revoked so that he/she cannot 
access those resources after leaving the company. RBAC thus simplifies the management of 
permissions and privileges. RBAC systems implement separation of duties (SoD) effectively. 
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SoD ensures that no user will be able to access random documents which are not needed in 
his/her domain.  
 RBAC thus effectively prevents users from prying on information not relevant to their 
job role. Insider threat is a different kind of a problem wherein a user has legal access to 
information but acts maliciously with it. ‘Malicious activity’ can be defined as that activity 
which is not similar to the normal working behavior of the other users in the group and carrying 
it out will result in a loss to the organization, intellectually or financially. Hence, in insider threat 
detection, a user’s behavior is usually modeled and behavior analysis is carried out. The 
detection system tries to detect malicious activity by comparing it with normal trained behavior. 
Role based monitoring [22] is a very important method of detection which uses the role 
hierarchy to train and monitor the behavior. The idea is to train only those users who belong to a 
single role because they exhibit similar behavior. The purpose of defining and using a role is to 
group users of the same kind. Hence the behavior of all the users in a given role will be quite 
similar as compared to users from other roles. For example, users from engineering role exhibit 
similar behavior in accessing a particular document as compared to the users from a finance role. 
This property of role segregation is being used effectively in our experiments. We prove with 
results here that role based detection mechanisms perform considerably well as compared to non-
role based detection systems. The term ‘RBAC-based systems’ means that the role structures are 
being taken into account during behavior analysis, and in no way means that the access to those 
documents are being restricted. ‘Access control’ here does not refer to revoking/denying access 
to the users. The very concept of insider threat comes into the picture when the access is given to 
the users and it is misused.  
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2. SIMULATION SYSTEM 
2.1 Scalable Simulation Framework (SSF)   
The simulator was built on top of the Scalable Simulation Framework (SSF) [23]. SSF is 
a public-domain standard for discrete-event simulation. Simulations can be carried out on 
complex systems in C++ and Java. SSF achieves good parallel performance by using parallel 
simulation to improve the scalability of the simulation for large systems. It also reduces memory 
usage and computational complexity. SSF can run simulation on both shared-memory 
multiprocessors and distributed-memory machine clusters. 
 SSF supports both process and event-oriented approaches. The SSF uses a special 
multithreading mechanism which reduces the context switching cost. The five basic components 
in SSF are listed below. 
• Entity: An entity is a container for state variables of the simulation. The processes, 
inChannels and outChannels are owned by the entity. 
• Process: The process is a part of an entity. They are activated by the entity. 
• inChannel: This is a communication link between the entities. The entity receives all 
messages from other entities on its inChannel.  
• outChannel: The communication link between the entities consist of the outChannel and 
the inChannel. When the entities send any message on the outChannel, all the inChannels 
mapped to this outChannel get this message. 
• Event: These are the messages which are exchanged between the entities.  
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2.2 Simulator   
 Insider threat detection has become a very important security feature for organizations. 
Much effort has been put in to effectively detect the insiders. Various proposals have been put 
forward to detect the insiders, but the fundamental issue with this is to carry out these 
experiments or test new algorithms on real world data. It is very difficult to get real world data to 
test the algorithms because there is no easy way to identify a real malicious user. There are no set 
rules which say that only these behaviors are malicious. And it is difficult to get data from 
organizations to carry out experiments because of data privacy.  
 This resulted in the need for a simulator which could simulate a real world organization 
experience. The goal was to develop a framework that can simulate a large number of users, their 
login and logout times, their accesses to the documents etc. The simulator also acts like a 
monitoring system by monitoring all these features and storing them in a log file. The simulator 
was built as an extension to the JANUS simulator by Boeing. Our simulator is compatible with 
the JANUS simulator. A block diagram of the system is given in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Simulation system 
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Mode of operation: 
1. The log generator consists of: 
a. The simulator, when run, generates log files which simulate the log files being 
generated by a monitoring system in an organization.  
b. Policy engine: These logs are input to the policy engine which applies the RBAC 
policies on the logs to generate the final logs.  
2. The detection engine consist of: 
a. Parser: This module parses the logs to extract the desired features from the logs 
and pass it on to the algorithms. 
b. Algorithms: These are the data mining algorithms which are used in this thesis for 
detection purposes.  
The simulator allows us to define:- 
• Role: A behavior file is attached to a role which defines the behavior pattern of that role. 
Any number of roles can be defined in the simulator.  
• User: An individual user in an organization. The user belongs to any role and thus will 
exhibit behavior consistent with that role. The simulator supports up to 5000 users.  
• Behavior: We can define a behavior for each role by controlling various features in the 
behavior file. We can even define what a malicious access would be. The login times, 
frequency of access to the documents, download rates etc. can be controlled using this 
behavior file.  
• Document: These are the resources which will be accessed by the users. A document can 
belong to any role (single/multiple roles).  
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• Transaction records (log): Logs can be generated similar to a monitoring system log in a 
real organization. These logs are used later for feature extraction and detection purposes.  
A block diagram of the simulator is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Steps taken by the Simulator to generate the logs: 
1. Simulator reads the ConfigFile and gets the name of the ScenarioFile to be read. It also 
gets the start time, start date of the logs to be simulated.  
2. The simulator reads the ScenarioFile and gets the information about the users and their 
corresponding behavior files.  
3. The simulator reads all the behavior files and generates logs based on that. 
4. The simulator stores the logs in a LogFile. 
Transaction records generated by the simulator will have the following information: 
• User: Who accessed the resource 
• Role: Which role does the user belong to 
• Document: Which resource was accessed 
Figure 2: Simulator 
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• Action: Did the user read/write/download the document? 
• Time of access: When (date and time) did the user access the document?  
• Login time: What time did the user login? 
• Download details: Amount of downloads by the user 
The log contains access information for all users across the system. It is a consolidated report 
which will be used later by the data mining algorithms for feature extraction and insider attack 
detection purposes.  
The simulator uses Markov chain modeling to generate access logs of the users. A 
Markov chain is a discrete random process with the Markov property. A Markov property is a 
property of a stochastic process. A stochastic process is said to have a Markov property if the 
conditional probability distribution of future states depends only on the current state and not on 
the probability of the past states. Thus it is not possible to predict the future state of the system. 
A discrete random process is a process which can be in different states and can change states 
randomly in discrete steps.  
One of the features which can be used to differentiate between a normal and a malicious 
user is the frequency of access of the documents. Markov chains are used for simulating this 
scenario. In Figure 3, we can see the Markov chain for the normal user. In Figure 4, we can see 
another Markov chain for the malicious user. We can control the transition probability using 
Markov chains. The simulator runs through the Markov chain and writes the transactions into the 
logs. This way the simulator generates user access data. 
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Scenario File: 
The scenario file is shown in Figure 5.  
1-(p12+p13) 
0.3-0.5 
0.2-0.3 
 1  2 
3 4 
1-(p12+p13) 
0.1-0.3 
0.3-0.5 
 1  2 
3 4 
Figure 3: Access probability for normal users 
Figure 4: Access probability for a malicious user 
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The important fields in the scenario file are: 
• ScenarioFile  – name of the ScenarioFile.  
• startDate – Format is month/date/year. If left empty, current date is used. 
• startTime – Format is hour:minute:second. If left empty, current time is used. 
• Seed – Mention any number as the seed. Use ‘rand’ to generate a random seed. 
• outputFile – name of the outputFile where the logs will be stored. 
Behavior File: 
The behavior file is shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
The important fields in the behavior file are: 
• {Name, Role}: It indicates which role the user (name) belongs to. 
Figure 6: Example behavior file 
Figure 5: Example scenario file 
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• {Resource, Action}: It indicates which resources are being accessed by the user and what 
is the action (read/write) on that resource. 
• FileSize: It is the size of the document which is being downloaded. It can be different for 
each state (indicating that the file size is dynamic and can change anytime).  
• Malicious: This field is used when you want to define a user as malicious.  
2.3 Policy Engine  
The policy engine applies the RBAC policies on the log files generated by the simulator. These 
are the final logs which simulate the logs generated by the monitoring system in an organization. 
The policy engine allows/denies access to the users based on the policies (by checking if the log 
accesses are adherent to RBAC rules) in the log file. A block diagram of the policy engine is 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Steps taken by the PolicyEngine to generate the logs:- 
1. PolicyEngine reads the input log file (from the simulator). 
2. It also reads the RBAC rule file to get information on the role-resource mapping. 
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3. It then grants/denies access to each log and stores the result in a PolicyLogFile.  
RBAC rule file:  
We need to define the RBAC rules first before running the PolicyEngine. The format of the 
RBAC file is shown in Figure 8.  
 
A:MechRole, A:ChemRole and A:FinRole are the roles in the system. A:MechDoc, 
A:MechECDoc are the valid resources which can be accessed by A:MechRole. Similarly 
A:ChemDoc and A:ChemECDoc are the valid resources which can be accessed by A:ChemRole. 
“Role” is the field name in the log file which has the role names. “Resource” is the field name in 
the log file which has the resource information. The PolicyEngine allows access to valid 
resources but blocks access to attempts which are not valid.  
2.4 Parser 
The parser is a part of the detection system. This module comes before the algorithms module. 
This module extracts the necessary features needed for the algorithms and passes them to the 
algorithms. Choosing the right features is very critical for effective insider detection. There are 
some features which, when used, clearly distinguish the abnormal from normal behavior. The 
user of this simulator gets to choose the features to be extracted from the logs by specifying them 
in the formatLog file. This file acts as a configuration file for the parser. The parser is very 
flexible, in the sense that the logs with any fields can be input to the parser for feature extraction. 
Figure 8: Example rbac file 
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The user has to store the fields of the logs in the format file for the parser to understand the new 
format. A block diagram of the parser is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
 
 
Steps taken by the parser to calculate the features: 
1. The parser reads the logs from the PolicyLogFile. 
2. The format of the logs is stored in format_log.csv. The features to be calculated are also 
listed there. The parser parses the logs accordingly. 
3. The parser parses the logs and stores the feature results in the feature file. This will be 
used by the algorithms so they are stored in an algorithm-readable form. 
 
Fields in FormatFile:  
• Log Format, <version>: Default version is 1. The fields after this field indicate the fields 
in the log file. The parser parses the log file accordingly. When the user adds a new 
Figure 9: Parser 
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functionality to the framework (new fields added), the version number should be 
incremented.  
• Features :  
• User, <field in the log>, <user name>: This field is used to find features from a 
particular user. Below, we can see that Mike is the user listed. So the parser 
calculates the features of Mike’s accessed logs only. If <user name> is left empty, 
all the user’s logs are used to calculate the features. <field in the log> denotes 
which corresponding field is the user name field in the logs. 
• Document, <field in the log>, <document name>: This field talks about the 
document/resource over which the features are calculated.  
• FeatureChar1, <field in the log>, <feature 1 options>: The FeatureChar1 and 
FeatureChar2 are the feature results which will be used by the algorithms. Each 
Feature is calculated and stored. Here we list the first feature. The options are: 
• AccessFreq – Calculates the access frequency of the document. 
• Read – Calculates the read frequency of the document. 
• Write – Calculates the write frequency of the document. 
• Download – Calculates the download frequency of the document. 
• FeatureChar2, <field in the log>, <Feature 2 options>: The options are same as 
above. It has one extra feature, FirstAccess, which calculates the time at which 
first access of the document happened.  
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• Freq, <field in the log>, <Frequency parameter>: In the feature fields above, the 
frequency has to be defined. The options are perDay, perSession, perWeek or 
perMonth.  
• Algorithm, <algorithm used for detection>: The algorithm which will be used for 
the detection is listed here. We use five algorithms in this thesis. The parser 
generates results compatible for any algorithm. 
• RBAC, <field in the log>, <1 or 0>: This field indicates if RBAC has to be 
applied during calculation of logs or not.  
• RBACRole, <field in the log>, <role name>: If RBAC=1, mention the role which 
the user should be a member of. Only those role logs are used.  
• END: This denotes the end of the format log.  
 The fields are flexible. The positions can be changed anytime and the parser will parse correctly. 
The feature fields (corresponding log file field names) should be right for the parser to work 
properly. An example format_log file is shown in Figure 10.  
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Example format_log file 
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3. INSIDER DETECTION ALGORITHMS 
3.1 One Class SVMs 
 One class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) [24, 25] is a special class of SVM which 
estimates high density regions from data samples. The OC-SVM methodology trains using only 
positive information. The negative information is not known. This SVM method computes a 
function that takes the value +1 in high density regions (normal class) and -1 elsewhere 
(abnormal class).  
 The one class SVMs map the data points into a feature space. The feature space is 
determined by a kernel function. There are many types of kernel functions. The kernel functions 
separate them from the origin with maximum margin. The kernel function solves the following 
quadratic optimization problem [24] to build a hyper-plane. This hyper-plane separates the data 
points from the origin.  
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where: 
 
ϕ
 = mapping defining the kernel function.  
v
 = constant which represents the upper bound on the fraction of outliers outside the estimated 
region. If total sample points = 100 and   v = 0.2, then 20 points may be wrongly classified. They 
are considered to be the outliers. In OC-SVM, we can control the number of outliers we need. 
The result contains a vector of +1 (data belonging to normal class) and -1 (data belonging to 
abnormal class). We use the Gaussian kernel (radial basis function kernel) for our experiments.  
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3.2 Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) 
Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) [26, 27] is inspired by the support vector 
classifier. SVDD plots a spherical boundary (with a RBF kernel) around the given dataset. The 
SVDD also works well with other kernel functions. The main goal of SVDD, like other one class 
classifiers, is to detect outliers without any negative examples present in the dataset. Many 
algorithms compute the complete density of a given dataset to detect the outliers. But this results 
in a huge data set requirement. Here in SVDD, just the boundaries are calculated.  
SVDD defines a model which gives a closed boundary around the dataset. It can be 
considered to be a hyper-sphere. Consider a sphere with center a and radius 0>R . The goal is to 
minimize the volume of the sphere such that the sphere contains all the given training objects. 
This is achieved by minimizing the distance .2R  
[24] defines an error function, which minimizes the chance of accepting outlier objects.  
( ) 2, RaRF =  
which has to be minimized with the constraint:  
22 Raxi ≤−  
Slack variables are introduced below to account for outliers in training set. 
( ) i
i
CRaRF ε∑+= 2,  
with constraints that almost all objects are within the sphere:  
0,22 ≥+≤− iii Rax εε  
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where C  gives the tradeoff between the volume of the data description and the errors it is 
making on the target data. So we constrain the solution such that almost all objects are in the 
sphere.  
Consider a test object z. The distance to the sphere’s center is calculated. If the distance is 
smaller than the radius (shown below), the test object z is accepted.  
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ ≤+−=−
ji
jijiii Rxxxzzzaz
,
22
..2. ααα
i
 
where 0≥iα is a Lagrangian multiplier.  
By using flexible kernel functions, we can do away with using the rigid hyper-sphere 
model. SVDD with RBF kernel behaves similar to one class SVMs. An ideal kernel function is 
one which maps the target data onto a bounded, spherically shaped area in the feature space and 
places the outliers outside this bounded area. Several kernel functions have been proposed for the 
support vector classifier, where not all map the target set in a bounded region in feature space. In 
this thesis, we use polynomial kernel with degree 3.  
3.3 Fast Adaptive Mean Shift (FAMS) 
Mean shift clustering is an unsupervised classification mechanism [28, 29]. The main 
goal of clustering is to form data into meaningful groups. These are called clusters. It also 
includes determining the number of groups and also the assignment of the data points to the 
groups. The mean shift algorithm is a nonparametric clustering technique. The prior knowledge 
of the number of clusters is not needed. Clustering algorithms require a parameter which 
calculates the degree to which two objects are alike. It is called the similarity measure. A few 
examples of similarity measure are Euclidean distance, Mahalanobis distance etc. Maximizing 
the intra-cluster similarity is the main goal along with minimizing the inter-cluster similarity. 
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The main disadvantage of mean shift is that in higher dimensions the algorithm goes slow. Hence 
there is a need to use a fast algorithm to perform neighborhood queries when computing. This is 
Fast Adaptive Mean Shift (FAMS). An approximate nearest neighbor search technique called 
Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) is used to improve the neighborhood queries in FAMS [29].  
Given n  data points nixi ,....,1, =   on a d-dimensional space, sample point estimator [29] 
is given by 
∑
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where )(xk  is the profile of kernel.  
The algorithm is adaptive in the sense that the data points always move to the local 
density maxima. The mean shift vector always points in the direction of the maximum density 
increase. This is the main principle of mean-shift based clustering. An iterative procedure is used 
here. This is also known as the hill climbing technique. The goal of this is to reach a stationary 
point of the density where the gradient vanishes.  
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where )(xg is defined when the derivative of )(xk exists. The initial position of the kernel, i.e. 
the starting point of the procedure 1y , can be chosen as one of the points ix . 1+jy  is the 
approximate neighbor of jy . These points of convergence are usually the modes, i.e. the local 
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maxima of the density. ih is the bandwidth value associated with the data points. When hhi = , 
the adaptive mean shift method becomes the fixed bandwidth mean shift.  
3.4 One Class Classifier 
One class classification combines a density estimator and class probability estimation 
[30-32]. The density estimator is used to form a reference distribution which is used to generate 
artificial data. This artificial data is used to form a second class (artificial class) to make it a two-
class classification problem. The density function of the reference distribution can be combined 
with the class probability estimates to form an adjusted estimate of the density function of the 
target class [30]. An example of a reference distribution is multi-variate normal distribution. This 
distribution can be estimated from the training data for the target class. This artificial data is used 
as a second class and thus modeled as a two-class classification method. The method of 
combining the density function and the class probability estimate improves the performance of 
outlier detection as compared to using one-class classification with density function alone.  
One method to generate artificial data is to generate uniformly distributed data and learn 
a classifier that can differentiate this data. One problem with this method is that as the 
dimensionality increases, it becomes difficult to generate artificial data to match the target data 
set. Reduced artificial dataset results in no improved discrimination because the probability of 
this artificial instance occurring close to the target class becomes much less. The solution is to 
produce an artificial dataset that is as close to the target set as possible. Hence instead of using 
uniform distribution, the distribution of this artificial data, known as “reference distribution”, is 
used.  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )AXPXTPTPXTPTPTXP //1//1/ −−=  
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The above equation relates the density of artificial class ( )AXP /  to the density of target class 
( )TXP / through the function ( )XTP /  and the prior probability of the target class ( )TP  [30]. 
( )AXP /  is chosen and a user specified amount of artificial data is generated. The class 
label A  is assigned to every instance of this data and class label T  to every instance in the 
training set for the target class. Those two sets are then combined. The proportion of instances 
belonging to T in this combined dataset is an estimate of ( )TP . A learning algorithm can be 
applied to this two-class dataset which obtains a class probability. This estimator 
replaces ( )XTP / . By choosing an appropriate function to calculate ( )AXP / , we can compute an 
estimate of the target density function ( )TXP /  for all instances of .X  
3.5 Filter Using Interquartile Ranges  
Interquartile Range (IQR) can be defined as a statistical method depicting the distance between 
the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile. The range of the middle 50% of the data is usually 
referred to as the interquartile range. These data ranges are not affected by the outliers because 
the data lies in the middle 50%. IQR can also be equated with the length of the box in a box plot. 
A box plot is an easy way to group numerical data in terms of quartiles. This method indicates 
which samples can be considered as outliers. WEKA defines an attribute value filter for 
interquartile range method. This filter sorts values by the mean (median) of the sample’s distance 
from all data points for a feature. 
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4. RESULTS 
Five algorithms were used to plot the results of insider threat detection.  
• One class Support Vector Machines 
• Support Vector Data Description 
• One class classification (using density and class probability estimation)  
• Filter for detecting outliers using interquartile ranges  
• Fast Adaptive Mean Shift (FAMS) 
LIBSVM [33] was used to run OC-SVM and SVDD experiments. LIBSVM supports 
support vector classification and distribution estimation. WEKA [34] was used for OC classifier 
and interquartile range filter. WEKA contains tools which perform classification, regression, 
clustering etc.  
We compare the RBAC models with Non-RBAC models for all these algorithms. Also, 
we measure the performance of each algorithm to see which performs better.  
Training Data:  
The scenario used here is that the mechanical role users and chemical role users access a 
common document (as shown in Figure 11).   
• With RBAC: Training data has only Mech role users. 100 users make up the training 
data. The training logs are taken for 100 days.  
• Without RBAC: Training data has both Mech role and Chem role users. The training logs 
are taken from 100 users from each role for 100 days.  
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Test Data:  
    One malicious user is subjected to insider attack detection. The test data has 100 days of 
activity recorded.  
 
 
Features: 
There are a lot of features which can be extracted from the logs of the user’s accesses. 
Choosing the right features helps in modeling the behavior of the users accurately. The access 
behavior differs for each role. For our results here, we have chosen the access frequency of this 
common document and the first access time of the document to be the features for the 
algorithms, and the results are discussed below.  
 In a two-class prediction problem, the outcomes can be labeled as positive or negative. In 
our scenario, positive maps to detecting a malicious user and negative maps to classifying the 
user as normal (not malicious). There are four possible outcomes by using this kind of a 
classifier. If the user is actually malicious and he/she is detected as malicious, it is known as a 
true positive (TP). If the user is malicious and has been classified as normal, then it is a false 
Mech 
Behavior 
Chem 
Behavior 
CommonDoc 
Mech Role Chem Role 
Figure 11: Scenario 1 
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negative (FN). If the user is normal and is being detected as malicious, then that is a false 
positive (FP). True negatives (TN) are those when the normal users are correctly classified as 
normal.  
4.1 Performance Analysis of the Algorithms 
Scenario 1 
Shown below are the results of all the algorithms on the test data. The mech role user’s 
behavior and chem role user’s behavior differ slightly. The malicious user’s behavior is defined 
such that it is quite similar to the chem role user. The Markov chain has only four states. For the 
mech user, only one state corresponds to the common document access, whereas for the chem 
role and the malicious user, three of the four states correspond to common document access. The 
initial probability of accessing a common document for a mech role user is 0.4 and for a chem 
role user is 0.6. The hold time in that state (read/write a common document) is exponentially 
distributed (with mean =50) for mech role users and (mean =30) for chem role users (mal user’s 
mean=25). This way, we simulate the higher access frequency for a chem role user. The test seed 
for this experiment is 100 and the training seeds are {100,200….1000}. The malicious user’s 
behavior is modified by controlling the state transition probability and the hold times. The start 
time for the day also differs between the roles. The chem role user’s work day begins at 10AM 
as compared to the mech role user’s start time of 9AM. This contributes to the detection 
purposes because of the clustering of the normal data.  Define two behavior files for the test data: 
a normal behavior file similar to the mech role and another, a malicious behavior file. In the 
malicious behavior file, uncomment the field “Malicious” and mention a distribution. We have 
31 
 
used uniform distribution with a range of (15-25). This generates malicious activity every 15-25 
days.  
 We can see that the RBAC based models perform better than the Non-RBAC based 
models. The algorithms detect the malicious users effectively when using RBAC. This is because 
in Non-RBAC models, there is a lot of data which misleads the detection algorithms. The data 
points from the chem role users are treated as normal. The chem role users may be required to 
access these documents a lot more frequently and that is normal for their role. But mech role 
users’ behavior is such that they access it very rarely. In Non-RBAC models, these differences 
are not considered when training the algorithms. It just looks at all the accesses in the system and 
models the algorithms. Now when a mech role insider with malicious intent accesses the 
document at an abnormally high rate (abnormal from the mech role’s perspective, normal from 
the chem role’s perspective), he/she will be classified as normal because the access behavior 
matches that of chem role even though he is not a chem role user. This is the drawback of using 
non-RBAC based models. In RBAC-based models, the chem role data points are not taken into 
account when training the algorithms. This gives a clear distinction between the roles and their 
behaviors. The same malicious user who went undetected in the non-RBAC case will be detected 
because of the abnormality in his access pattern.  
In Figure 12, we have plotted the true positives for all the algorithms. The malicious user 
shows malicious activity on 5 days out of the total 100 days. In Figure 13, the false positives for 
all the algorithms are plotted. 
The error bars represent the confidence interval (confidence level=95%) associated with 
each data point.  Each run is based on different training data set. We can see that the density-
based algorithms perform consistently well. The interquartile range is the distance between the 
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75th percentile and the 25th percentile. The IQR is essentially the range of the middle 50% of the 
data. As the spread of the data points reduces, the IQR performs better. The IQR also performs 
well if the data points fewer clusters.  The one class classifier is basically a density estimation 
algorithm. OC-SVM however performs consistently well. However this does not mean that the 
algorithms which are performing poorly are bad in detection because the algorithm’s parameters 
were not the optimal values. For comparison purposes, we have chosen to treat 5% of the 
training purposes as outliers in all algorithms. Each algorithm has its own optimal value at which 
it performs well. The behavior of SVDD is particularly very unpredictable because of the uneven 
decision boundaries plotted. The OC-SVM also has consistent low false positive rates as 
compared to OneClass Classifer and Interquartile filter, which have low FP in RBAC cases. 
FAMS has the highest false positives. This is because of the way the data is clustered into 
groups. In non-rbac systems, there is a lot of scattered data. Outliers are detected by marking the 
farthest ‘n’ percent of the points in the set. This method results in the wrong classification of 
many normal accesses.  
In the RBAC case (Figure 14), OC-SVM, SVDD and one class classifier all detect the 
malicious user perfectly. The influence of other roles in non-RBAC systems can be high, 
resulting in the wrong classification of the normal accesses.  
SVDD’s performance improves when RBAC is used (Figures 14 and 15). The true 
positive rate (TPR) has increased and the false positive rate (FPR) has been steady. The one class 
classifier performs fairly well both the cases (Figures 12-15). Interquartile performs the best of 
the five algorithms in the given scenario in non-RBAC cases and OC-SVM performs the best in 
RBAC scenarios.  
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 We can clearly see that RBAC based detection systems perform well. The non-RBAC 
system performs badly because some of the malicious user’s activity is similar to the chem role 
and the chem roles activity is being trained as normal activity. We can see that RBAC based 
systems detect the malicious users effectively, i.e. have a high true positive. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
True 
Positives 
No RBAC 
Figure 12: Error bars with confidence interval=95% 
 
        OC-SVM            SVDD         OC Classifier     Interquartile         FAMS 
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        OC-SVM            SVDD         OC Classifier     Interquartile         FAMS 
Figure 13: Error bars with confidence interval=95% 
        OC-SVM            SVDD         OC Classifier     Interquartile         FAMS 
Figure 14: Error bars with confidence interval=95% 
No RBAC 
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Scenario 2 
The following scenario depicts the performance of RBAC and non-RBAC systems. Here 
the malicious user’s behavior is varied and the performance of these two systems on all the 
algorithms is compared. The Markov chain parameters are the same as the first scenario. The 
state transition probability for the malicious user is varied (brought closer to chem role behavior 
by increasing the probability of access to common document). The seed for the training data run 
is 1000 and the test data seeds are {1000-5000} (5 runs for each scenario). The initial behavior 
for the malicious user is very different from both chem and mech roles. We have used uniform 
distribution with a range of (15-25) to generate the malicious activity.  
We can see in Figure 16 that, when the behavior of the malicious user is much different 
from both roles, non-RBAC systems detect well. But as the behavior becomes similar to the 
chem role, the performance of the algorithms goes down.  
  
False 
Positives 
Figure 15: Error bars with confidence level = 95% 
        OC-SVM            SVDD         OC Classifier     Interquartile         FAMS 
 RBAC 
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In the first run (Figure 16), the malicious user behavior is very different from mech role 
and chem role. Thus all the algorithms easily detect the malicious access. With every new run, 
the malicious behavior is brought closer to the chem role behavior. We can see that the detection 
rate comes down. This is because the malicious behavior is now similar to the chem role 
behavior and the non-RBAC systems treat the chem role accesses as normal. It can be noted that 
SVDD performs poorly with the runs.  
In Figure 17, we see that as the behavior becomes similar to chem role, the false positives 
increase slightly. This is because the malicious behavior is very similar to chem role and the 
chances of wrongly classifying the test data are high. The interquartile method remains very 
effective irrespective of the change in malicious behavior. FAMS performs badly with very high 
false positives.  
 
 
No RBAC-True Positives 
Detection 
on 5 
malicious 
users  
Similar to Chem Role Totally different from both roles…. 
Figure 16: Error bars showing stderr 
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In Figure 18, we can see that the RBAC based detection works well on all algorithms. 
The change in the malicious behavior does not affect the detection algorithms. This is because 
the algorithms are trained only on the mech role user’s behavior. The chem role accesses are all 
treated as malicious. Thus even when the malicious behavior becomes similar to chem role 
behavior, the algorithms detect them as malicious.  
The false positives, too, remain more or less steady in this scenario (Figure 19). It can be 
seen that the interquartile method has an increased false positive as compared to the non-RBAC 
cases. FAMS and SVDD reduce their false positives as compared to the non-RBAC scenarios. In 
all the cases, we can observe that OC-SVM is very consistent and performs the detection well 
with few false positives.  
 
No RBAC – False Positives 
Similar to Chem Role Totally different from both roles…. 
Detection 
on 95 
normal 
users  
Figure 17: Error bars showing stderr 
 
38 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RBAC – True Positives 
Totally different from both roles…. Similar to Chem Role 
Detection 
on 5 
malicious 
users  
RBAC – False Positives 
Totally different…. Similar to Chem Role 
Detection 
on 95 
normal 
users  
Figure 18: Error bars showing stderr 
 
Figure 19: Error bars showing stderr 
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Scenario 3 
We have seen that overall, all the algorithms perform well when the systems are RBAC based. 
But how do we distinguish which algorithm performs well overall? We have seen that all the 
algorithms have a high true positive rate and hence it is difficult to separate their performance 
using this criterion. So we run experiments to check which algorithm has the lowest false 
positive rate.  
The Markov chain parameters remain the same as in scenario 1 and 2. The mech role 
user’s behavior is varied (test and training seeds=1000….5000) by changing the transition 
probabilities and the hold times. We have used uniform distribution with a range of (15-25) to 
generate the malicious activity. In this scenario, all algorithms are run with the optimal 
parameters. Hence we see a difference in observation between this scenario and scenarios 1, 2. 
We see that (Figure 20-21) OC-SVM has the least FPR in non-RBAC scenarios but has a 
considerably high FPR in RBAC scenarios. SVDD performs very choppily. In this scenario, 
FAMS performs badly in non-RBAC based models but improves its performance in RBAC 
based systems.  
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Overall, the interquartile method performs well in RBAC systems along with one class 
classifier. It can be observed that both these algorithms use density estimation.  
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Figure 20: Error bars showing stderr 
 
Figure 21: Error bars showing stderr 
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Scenario 4 
This scenario tests the effect of ‘other’ roles which affect the decision making of the algorithms. 
This experiment is run only in the non-RBAC case because the ‘other’ roles contribution is 
considered only in this case. Initial test seed=1000. The training data is varied by adding Chem 
Role users (initial training seeds=100,200….500). No behavior is varied here because the effect 
of the number of roles on the detection algorithms is being plotted here.  
 We have used uniform distribution with a range of (10-25) to generate the malicious 
activity. We can see that as the number of chem role users (‘other’ role) increases, the algorithms 
suffer in accuracy. Their true positives (Figure 22) go down and correspondingly the false 
positives (Figure 23) shoot up.  
 
 
True 
Positives 
for 10 
accesses 
 
Number of Chem users 
 
Figure 22: Error bars showing stderr 
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ROC Curves 
A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) is  a graphical plot of the sensitivity or true 
positives vs. false positives (1-specificity) for a binary classification system. The area under the 
ROC curve quantifies the overall ability of the algorithms in discriminating the malicious users 
from the normal users. An ideal algorithm is one whose area under the ROC curve is 1, i.e it has 
0 false positive rate for all values of true positive rate. This means that the algorithm detects the 
abnormal users efficiently and does not wrongly classify the normal users. Now we know that 
the higher the slope of the ROC curve (or more the area under the curve), the better the 
algorithm. In the ROC experiment run here, we have chosen 10 malicious user accesses out of 
100 accesses. Because of the imbalance in the number of malicious accesses vs. the number of 
normal accessses, the ROC curve appears very effective (Figure 24). But in reality, the false 
positives (x-axis) scale is different from the true positives scale, thus providing a better looking 
Figure 23: Error bars showing stderr 
 
1              10                100            200           500 
    Number of Chem users 
 
False 
Positives 
for 10 
accesses 
 
43 
 
ROC curve. But this is of little importance because this applies to all five algorithms and the 
main goal is to choose the best performing algorithm.  
 The optimal values for the algorithms are used here to get the best possible performances 
from the algorithms. The interquartile method starts off well. It has a low false positive rate up 
until half the curve. Then the false positives suddenly shoot up. This phenomenon is yet to be 
understood. But overall, it has a healthy ROC curve and performs well. The one class classifier 
lags the interquartile method till half way, but the performance holds well for the rest of the 
curve too.  
 
 
 
 
 The OC-SVM and SVDD perform similarly and lag behind the density based algorithms 
in performance. These two algorithms perform relatively poorly right from the start and have 
pretty high false positives (as compared to one class and interquartile). This gap stays all along 
True 
Positive 
Rate 
(Sensitivity) 
 
Figure 24: ROC curve 
 
False Positive Rate (1 – Specificity) 
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the curve. The area under the curve of OC-SVM and SVDD  is less than that of one class and 
interquartile. FAMS performs badly with high false positives.  
4.2 RBAC vs. Non-RBAC Systems 
 We have seen that the RBAC systems perform better than the non-RBAC systems. The 
experiments were run using the access frequency as the feature. In the following, we give an 
account of all the features used for detection. One class SVM algorithm was used for these 
experiments with target rejection rate of 5%. Any contrasting mech and chem role user behavior 
(and malicious user behavior similar to chem role behavior) can be used to carry out these 
experiments. Use the parser to extract the respective features (access frequency, read, write and 
download) shown below.  
Scenario 6 (Feature = Access Frequency)  
In Figure 25, we can see the user access frequency (access frequency of common doc) plotted. 
The access frequencies of the chem role users are very high compared to the mech role users. 
Figure 26 shows the test user’s activity and a spike in his access, which indicates malicious 
accesses. It can be seen that the RBAC systems detect those accesses as malicious whereas the 
non-RBAC systems do not.  
 
 
Figure 25: User access frequency 
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Scenario 7 (Feature = Download)  
This scenario depicts the difference in detection abilities of RBAC systems and non-RBAC 
systems with download as the feature. Here, the amount of data downloaded (documents 
downloaded to be specific) is tracked and used as a feature for modeling training data (Figure 
27). The test data has malicious activities in the form of high download accesses. It can be seen 
(Figure 28) that RBAC systems out-smart the non-RBAC systems.  
Figure 26: Test user’s activity 
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Scenario 8 (Read and Write)  
Figure 29 shows the performances of RBAC and non-RBAC systems with read access and write 
access features.  
Figure 27: User download feature 
 
figure 17 
 
Figure 28: Test user’s activity 
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Scenario 9 ( No access for ChemRole) 
This scenario deals with the case where the “other” roles do not have access to the mech role 
documents in a RBAC environment (Figure 30). In a non-RBAC environment, they can still 
access it. It can easily be deduced that the malicious attempts (from a user belonging to a 
different role) are always blocked by the RBAC system, and hence it performs at its best. The 
non-RBAC system fails to come close to this (Figure 31).  
Figure 29: Read and write feature 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
Malicious 
access  
Mech 
Behavior 
Chem 
Behavior 
Mech Doc 
Mech Role Chem Role 
Chem Doc 
Figure 30: Scenario 9 
 
Figure 31: Test user’s activity 
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4.3 Simulator Results 
The simulator is run for a specified time (Table 1). The results [35] are shown in the 
tables below. The SSF advances the time stamp to simulation_end_time if the simulation finishes 
before the specified simulation_end_time. The simulation ends when the last processing is 
carried out. Every user in the simulation generates 1000 logs. The simulation will end before all 
logs are printed when the simulation time is less. The number of logs printed increases as the 
simulation time increases and it reaches a constant when the simulation time is large.  
 
 
sim time (seconds) last log processing at Number of logs printed execution time  
(CPU Time) 
5 4.99E+06 191 0.000741 
10 9.98E+06 416 0.001565 
50 4.99E+07 2025 0.007299 
100 9.99E+07 3971 0.0143 
200 1.02E+08 4000 0.014478 
500 1.02E+08 4000 0.014644 
1000 1.02E+08 4000 0.01469 
 
One second= e+06 ticks in the simulation. 
 
In Figure 32, we can see that the actual simulation time, i.e. the time at which the last log was 
processed, is close to the simulation_end_time when the simulation time is much less.  
Table 1: Simulator results 
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In Figure 33, we can see that the number of logs reaches a constant as the simulation progresses. 
After the last log is processed, the simulation time is advanced to the end_time.  
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Figure 32: Actual simulation time vs. simulation time 
 
Figure 33: Number of messages vs. simulation time 
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Simulation time for the individual modules: 
 
Table 2 gives the simulation times and the capability of the modules in generating large number 
of logs. The time taken by the simulator to generate the logs increases as the number of logs/days 
increases. For example, 5000 users, 5,000,000 log generation will take about 30 minutes. The 
time taken by the policy engine to apply the policies to the logs are shown in Table 3. 
                Table 2: Time taken (average value) by the Simulator to generate the logs 
No. of users     
Number of logs 
             ^ 
              | 
 
100 
 
500 
 
1000 
 
2000 
 
5000 
500000 50 seconds 1 minute 70 seconds 90 seconds 100 seconds 
1000000 2 minutes 2 minutes 140 seconds 160 seconds 180 seconds 
2000000 6 minutes 7 minutes 7 minutes 7 minutes 8 minutes 
5000000 23 minutes 23 minutes 23 minutes 23 minutes 28 minutes 
 
      
      Table 3: Time taken (average value) by the PolicyEngine  to apply the policies to the logs 
 
No. of users     
Number of logs 
             ^ 
              | 
 
100 
 
500 
 
1000 
 
2000 
 
5000 
500000 6 seconds 5 seconds 5 seconds 5 seconds 5 seconds 
1000000 10 seconds 12 seconds 12 seconds 12 seconds 12 seconds 
2000000 30 seconds 25 seconds 30 seconds 30 seconds 30 seconds 
5000000 60 seconds 65 seconds 70 seconds 70 seconds 75 seconds 
 
       
Table 4 shows the time taken by the parser to parse the logs and calculate the features. The 
parser can parse up to 1,000,000 log entries and 2000 users (as compared to the simulator and the 
policy engine which can operate on up to 5,000,000 log entries). 
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Table 4: Time taken (average value) by the Parser to parse the logs and calculate the features 
 
No. of users     
Number of logs 
             ^ 
              | 
 
100 
 
500 
 
1000 
 
2000 
 
5000 
10000 0.5 seconds 3 seconds 4 seconds 8 seconds 20 seconds 
100000 6 seconds 20 seconds 35 seconds 80 seconds 180 seconds 
500000 35 seconds 2 minutes 5 minutes 6 minutes 17 minutes 
1000000 6 minutes 6 minutes 10 minutes 14 minutes - 
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APPENDIX: PARSER DETAILS 
Parser Framework:  
 The parser provides a flexible framework for the user. The user can define his own 
functions and plug them in the parser. This way, the user can extract any new features from the 
logs. The base class FeatureExtractor provides support for the feature calculation of a few 
features (version =1). Some of the important methods are: 
• storeFormatandLogFile(): This stores the format file and the policy log file in memory.  
• parseFormatFile(): This parses the format file and stores the fields. 
• calculateFeatureValues(): This calculates the features.  
• storeInSVMReadableForm(): The results are stored in SVM form.  
 
The user should inherit this base class and register their function using the below 
functions. The framework chooses the right methods during runtime based on the version 
number: 
• RegistercallbackFeature(): Implement the feature calculation logic and pass that function to 
this. 
• RegistercallbackLogs(): Implement the new format file parsing logic and pass that function to 
this.  
• RegistercallbackAlgoFormat(): Implement the support for the new algorithm input file format 
and pass that function here. 
Example code is shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35.  
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CPPFile(parser1.cc):
 
Figure 34: parser1.cc 
file  
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HeaderFile(parser1.h): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 continued 
 
Figure 35: parser1.h file 
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Additional Tool Available:  
To generate large sets of users, you can use the user-generation tool, gen_users.py. The code is 
shown in Figure 36. Enter the file name to store the user-behavior file combo in 
(ScenarioTrainVar.csv used below). Mention the range (number of users). Here 5000 users are 
generated. Mention the user name (Mike here). Mention the behavior file (MechBehavior.csv file 
used below). Run the  python script. 
This generates 5000 users (Mike0-Mike4999) with behavior file=MechBehavior.csv. You 
can use this to run the  simulator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: User generation script 
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